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Abstract
The vulnerability of deep neural networks (DNNs) to adversar-
ial examples is well documented. Under the strong white-box
threat model, where attackers have full access to DNN in-
ternals, recent work has produced continual advancements
in defenses, often followed by more powerful attacks that
break them. Meanwhile, research on the more realistic black-
box threat model has focused almost entirely on reducing the
query-cost of attacks, making them increasingly practical for
ML models already deployed today.
This paper proposes and evaluates Blacklight, a new de-
fense against black-box adversarial attacks. Blacklight targets
a key property of black-box attacks: to compute adversarial
examples, they produce sequences of highly similar images
while trying to minimize the distance from some initial benign
input. To detect an attack, Blacklight computes for each query
image a compact set of one-way hash values that form a prob-
abilistic fingerprint. Variants of an image produce nearly iden-
tical fingerprints, and fingerprint generation is robust against
manipulation. We evaluate Blacklight on 5 state-of-the-art
black-box attacks, across a variety of models and classifica-
tion tasks. While the most efficient attacks take thousands or
tens of thousands of queries to complete, Blacklight identifies
them all, often after only a handful of queries. Blacklight is
also robust against several powerful countermeasures, includ-
ing an optimal black-box attack that approximates white-box
attacks in efficiency. Finally, Blacklight significantly outper-
forms the only known alternative in both detection coverage
of attack queries and resistance against persistent attackers.
1 Introduction
The vulnerability of deep neural networks to a variety of ad-
versarial examples is well documented. Adversarial examples
are maliciously modified inputs that not only produce mis-
classifications by a model, but also are nearly identical to
original inputs via human perception. This vulnerability re-
mains a critical hurdle to the practical deployment of deep
learning systems in safety- and mission-critical applications,
such as autonomous vehicles, financial services, or digital
health services.
Adversarial attacks can be divided by whether they assume
white-box or black-box threat models. In the white-box set-
ting, the attacker has total access to the target model, including
its architecture and specific weights and parameters. Given
a benign input, the attacker can compute adversarial exam-
ples as an optimization algorithm. In the black-box setting,
the attacker is restricted from interacting with the model via
queries and classification outputs. Black-box scenarios can be
further divided into score- or decision-based, depending on
whether the target model returns a full probability distribution
across labels per query, or only the output label.
Under the strong white box threat model, both security
and ML communities have made continual advances in both
attacks and defenses. Powerful attacks provide more effi-
cient and versatile algorithms to generate adversarial exam-
ples [9, 11, 18, 25, 50], which in turn spur work on robust
defenses that either prevent the generation of adversarial ex-
amples or detect them at inference time. While numerous
approaches have been explored as defenses, including model
distillation [40], gradient obfuscation [5,14,31,44,47,52], ad-
versarial training [32, 55, 56], and ensemble methods [49],
nearly all have been proven vulnerable to followup at-
tacks [1, 6–8, 21].
In contrast, black-box attacks assume a more realistic threat
model, where attackers interact with models via a query in-
terface such as ML-as-a-service platforms [54], and do not
require leaked models, server compromises or malicious in-
siders. One type of “substitute model” attacks uses black-
box queries on the target model to train a substitute model,
then tries to transfer adversarial examples from the substi-
tute model to the target [29, 37, 38]. These can be effectively
defended by training on adversarial examples built on pre-
trained models [49]. More common attacks, however, are
query-based attacks, where an attacker fine tunes the inputs
based on query output from the target model, until they can
converge upon an adversarial example with small perturba-
tion from the original input. Multiple efforts have proposed
increasingly efficient attack algorithms that continuously re-
duce the queries necessary for a successful attack against both
score- and decision-based targets. Even as these attacks grow
in efficiency and practicality, there are no published results
describing effective defenses against them1.
In this paper, we propose Blacklight, a novel defense that
detects query-based black-box attacks using an efficient simi-
1There is a defense described in an unpublished arxiv report [13], and we
compare Blacklight against it in §7.
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larity engine operating on probabilistic content fingerprints.
Our detector relies on the fact that black-box attacks seek to
generate adversarial examples whose perturbation from be-
nign inputs is bounded. Thus the generation of an adversarial
example requires the attacker to submit to the target model
multiple queries that are similar to each other2. We detect this
similarity across multiple queries as an attack, since this level
of similarity rarely exists among benign queries.
Blacklight detects black-box attacks at inference time, by
computing for each input query a probabilistic fingerprint
composed of a small number of hash values. A query whose
probabilistic fingerprint matches any prior fingerprint by more
than a threshold is identified as part of a black-box attack. Fin-
gerprint hashes are designed such that multiple inputs with
small content differences will have high overlap in their fin-
gerprint hashes. Since we use secure one-way hashes, even
an attacker aware of our algorithm cannot optimize the per-
turbation to disrupt its fingerprints and avoid detection.
We evaluate the efficacy of Blacklight against 5 state-of-
the-art query-based black-box attacks, including attacks using
gradient estimation, gradient-free attacks, and attacks that
target both score-based and decision-based models. We per-
form experiments over a range of image-based models from
MNIST to ImageNet, and use Lp distance metrics chosen by
each attack. Our results show that while these attacks typically
take thousands (or tens of thousands) of queries to converge to
a successful adversarial example, Blacklight detects these at-
tacks after the first 2–6 queries3. Most importantly, Blacklight
detects the large majority of all queries associated with an at-
tack (>90% for all non-Boundary attacks), compared to <2%
for the only other defense in literature [13]. For resource-rich
attackers who persist after initial detection, Blacklight drops
attack success rate to 0% (by rejecting each detected attack
query), compared to 78%–100% when using [13] .
In summary, our work makes five key contributions.
• We propose a highly scalable, lightweight detection system
against query-based black-box attacks using probabilistic
fingerprints.
• We use formal analysis of our probabilistic fingerprints to
model both false positives and attack detection rates.
• We perform detailed experiments on multiple datasets and
models to evaluate Blacklight against multiple state-of-art
black-box attacks. Results show Blacklight can quickly
detect attacks, often after a handful of queries for attacks
that would require several thousands of queries to succeed.
• We compare Blacklight to the only known black-box de-
fense [13], and it significantly outperforms in both queries
detected and resistance against persistent attackers.
2In practice, even the most efficient black box attacks issue thousands of
queries to generate a single attack, and nearly all such queries are constrained
to be a small perturbation away from the benign input.
3The exception is the Boundary attack, which starts its query search with
an image from the target label. Blacklight detects Boundary attacks after an
average of less than 40 queries (see Table 5).
• Finally, we evaluate Blacklight and show that it is highly
robust against a variety of adaptive countermeasures, in-
cluding those allowing larger, human-visible perturbations.
Blacklight performs well even against two types of near-
optimal black-box attacks: “query-efficient” black-box at-
tacks that are several orders of magnitude more efficient
than current methods, and “perfect-gradient” black-box at-
tacks that perfectly estimate the loss surface at each query,
effectively approximating white-box attacks. Blacklight
detects 100% of perfect-gradient black-box attacks that em-
ulate CW (Carlini-Wagner), and 81% of those emulating
PGD (projected gradient descent).
2 Background and Related Work
In contrast to early work on strong white-box attacks [9,26,35,
39], our work focuses on the more realistic black-box attacks,
where the attacker only has query-level access to the target.
In this section, we describe prior work in two categories of
attacks with black-box assumptions (substitute model attacks
and query-based black-box attacks). We then describe five
state-of-the-art (query-based) black-box attacks (including
two variants), and the lone proposed defense [13].
2.1 Substitute Model Attacks
In a substitute model attack, an attacker generates a sequence
of specific queries on the target DNN model to generate a
substantial dataset capable of training a local substitute model
that shares classification boundaries as the target. Then the at-
tacker generates adversarial examples on the substitute model,
i.e. a standard white-box attack, with the goal that these adver-
sarial examples will transfer to the target DNN and cause mis-
classifications. The feasibility of this attack was first demon-
strated for untargeted adversarial examples on small models
(MNIST) [37, 38], while the attack was shown to be much
more difficult on targeted attacks and larger models [29].
In practice, substitute model attacks have two major short-
comings. First, success rates for these attackers are low and
eclipsed by the more common, query-based black-box attacks.
Second, there are effective defenses [26, 49] against them.
Kurakin et al. [26] has shown that an adversarially trained
model is robust against these attacks and Tramer et al. [49] fur-
ther improves the defense method using ensemble adversarial
training.
Our work targets the more effective query-based black-
box attacks. Blacklight is easily combined with existing de-
fenses [49] to build robust defenses against substitute model
attacks and query-based attacks (details in the appendix).
2.2 Query-Based Black-Box Attacks
The second and more effective type of black-box attacks are
often referred to as query-based black-box attacks. In these
attacks, attacker repeatedly sends queries to a target DNN
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model, and uses the result to iteratively optimizes each suc-
cessive query, with the goal of ultimately converging on a
successful adversarial example. While these attacks often
require thousands of queries to generate a single adversar-
ial example, they are extremely effective, and often achieve
100% attack success rates even against larger DNN models.
In addition, recent work [17] shows that query-based attacks
are feasible in the physical world, and pose a genuine threat
to safety and mission critical applications.
Black box attacks can vary significantly in number of
queries required, depending on how much information is
given by the target model. Black box attacks can be divided
into score-based attacks and decision-based attacks.
Score-based attacks. Score-based attacks require the
target model to return the per-class probabilities or confi-
dence scores for each input query. Chen et al. [12] pro-
poses the first such attack by computing coordinate-wise
numerical gradients of the target model at each pixel per
step, with zeroth-order stochastic coordinate descent. The
attack optimizes the loss function f (x) = max{log[F(x)]Lt −
maxi 6=Lt log[F(x)]i,−κ} where F(x) is the output probabili-
ties of the target model for x, Lt is the label for x, and κ≥ 0
is a tuning parameter for attack transferability. The attacker
sends out a sequence of carefully crafted inputs to the target
model and uses the output returned by the model to estimate
the gradient ∂ f (x)∂x .
A number of improvements followed. [2] reduces computa-
tion time by grouping the pixels at random or using PCA; [22]
reduces queries by computing the vector-wise gradient with
random vectors; [23] further extends this approach to incor-
porate time-dependent priors. Finally, [34] proposes an alter-
native optimization method that avoids sensitivity to choice
of hyperparameters by replacing gradient estimation.
Decision-based attacks. Decision-based attacks assume
that the model returns the output label for each query and noth-
ing more. [3] proposes a gradient estimation free technique
where the attacker starts from a large adversarial perturbation
and then seeks to iteratively reduce the perturbation while
staying adversarial. [22] also considers decision-based attacks,
and proposes a proxy for the softmax probability by using
a discretized score. HSJA [10] further speeds up boundary
attack by introducing gradient approximation.
2.3 State of the Art Attacks
To empirically test our proposed defense, we identify and
implement 5 state-of-art black-box attacks (listed in Table 1).
These represent all combinations of score-based vs. decision-
based attacks, as well as attacks based on gradient estima-
tion and those that do not rely on gradient estimation. These
include both score- and decision-based variants of the NES
attack [22], as well as the most recent and advanced black-box
attack (HSJA [10]). We briefly describe each attack below.
Gradient Estimation-based Gradient Estimation-Free
Score-based NES - Query Limit [22] ECO [34]
Decision-based
NES - Label Only [22]
HopSkipJumpAttack (HSJA) [10] Boundary Attack [3]
Table 1: 5 representative black-box attacks used in this work.
NES Attack (2 variants). The NES Attack [22] allows for
gradient estimation in far fewer queries than previous works
by maximizing the expected value of f (x) under a search
distribution pi(θ|x). The attack uses the estimated gradient to
perform a projected gradient descent update [32]. NES uses
natural evolution strategies [51] to speed up the attack, and
includes two variants: NES query limit for score-based target
models, and NES label-only for decision-based models.
Boundary Attack. Boundary Attack [3] is the first
decision-based attack, and uses a gradient estimation free
method. It is initialized with a random sample from the target
label. In each iterative step, the attacker reduces the distance
between the perturbed image and the original input while en-
suring the perturbed image is still classified to the target label.
The attack iterates until the distance between the perturbed
image and the original input is within the given budget.
ECO Attack. ECO Attack [34] replaces gradient estima-
tion with an efficient discrete surrogate to the optimization
problem. Also, the surrogate exploits the underlying problem
structure for faster convergence.
HSJA Attack. HSJA is the most recently proposed black-
box attack [10], and improves the Boundary Attack [3] by
augmenting it with gradient approximation. It also initializes a
perturbed image using an image from the target label, and then
iteratively alters that image to reduce the distance between it
and the original input. Each iteration of the attack includes
two steps. The first step uses binary search to find a sample
near the decision boundary between the perturbed image and
the original input. The second step estimates the gradient
and computes the step size to move towards the classification
boundary. Iterating these two steps helps the attack converge
much faster than the original Boundary Attack.
2.4 Existing Defense
We are only aware of one proposed defense against query-
based black-box attacks, Stateful Detection (SD), in an arxiv
paper by Chen, Carlini and Wager [13]. It augments an exist-
ing classifier with a detection component, which stores the
similarity vectors for all incoming queries, computed by a
pretrained similarity encoder, in a temporary history buffer.
For each new query, it computes k-nearest-neighbor distance
between it and all similarity vectors in the history buffer.
SD has two major limitations. First, due to the complex-
ity of training a similarity encoder, SD is only implemented
on small datasets like CIFAR-10 [13]. Second, due to the
high cost of computing query similarity, SD also resets the
detector after each detected attack query [13]. Later in §7.3,
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we evaluate Blacklight against SD on CIFAR-10, and show
that SD only detects a small proportion of all queries in an
attack, making it vulnerable to a persistent attacker who issues
multiple attack queries using multiple accounts.
3 Threat Model
We begin by defining our threat model.
Attacker. The attacker queries the target DNN model F
and uses the query results to craft adversarial examples against
F. Consider a targeted attack on misclassifying a source input
x0 to a target label Lt . The attacker repeatedly queries F with
a sequence of n attack queries (x0,x1, ...,xn), where xn is the
last query of the attack. The attack is successful if
F(xn) = Lt and ||xn− x0||p < ε (1)
where ε is the attack perturbation budget. Existing works
show that n is in the order of 103 to 106.
We make the following assumptions on the attacker:
• The attacker does not have access to the internal weights
of F and can only send queries to obtain outputs of F.
• The attacker has abundant computation power and re-
sources to submit millions of queries.
• The attacker owns and controls a number of user accounts
and IP addresses, which it uses to avoid IP address and ac-
count blocking. When banned, a persistent attacker simply
continues its attack on a different IP address and/or account.
Measurement studies show that it is common for attackers
to utilize many Sybil accounts in online attacks [15, 28, 53].
SD [13] also considers attackers with multiple accounts.
• We initially consider standard attackers who are unaware
of Blacklight. Later in §8, we consider stronger adaptive
attackers who customize countermeasures in order to avoid
our detection.
Defender. The defender hosts the target model F. For each
query, F can either return the classification probability vec-
tor or just the classification label. We make the following
assumptions on the defender:
• The defender has access to the queries submitted to F, and
a reasonable amount of computing resources.
• The defender has a finite amount of storage resources where
it stores data on past queries. The defender periodically
resets data on past queries, e.g. every 1 or 2 days. This
reset frequency can be tuned as desired to further increase
the time to perform any successful attack for persistent
attackers with unlimited resources.
Detection Metrics. The defender’s ultimate goal is to en-
sure no adversarial examples are processed by its model as
inputs. With that in mind, there are two main success metrics
for black-box defenses.
• Attack Detection Rate. An effective defense must be able to
detect the presence of an attack, where we define an attack
to be a sequence of queries which are all contributing to
computing a single adversarial example. Attack detection
rate is the ratio of all attacks detected sometime before it
successfully generates an adversarial example.
• Attack Query Coverage. Persistent attackers can easily
share partial progress results across IP addresses and ac-
counts if they are detected and banned. Without knowledge
of exact attack parameters, a defender cannot distinguish
between queries building towards an attack and an actual
attack with the computed adversarial example. Query cov-
erage is the ratio of all queries in an attack that are detected
as non-benign queries by the defender.
4 Blacklight Overview
We propose Blacklight, a system to detect and mitigate query-
based black-box attacks against DNN models. Blacklight
achieves this by exploiting a fundamental invariant of black-
box attacks: to construct adversarial examples that resemble
benign inputs, attackers must query the target DNN model
with a large number of images, many of which are highly
similar in the input space. Blacklight distinguishes attack
queries from benign queries by searching for this invariant in
a model’s stream of input queries.
To enable fast and scalable similarity computation across
millions of queries, Blacklight computes for each query a
probabilistic fingerprint, a set of bit strings generated by se-
cure one-way hashes that represent randomized samples of
the query. Computing a query’s fingerprint hashes requires
only a single pass to read the input query. Given a query,
searching a data store for similar queries (above a fingerprint
match threshold) is done by counting maximum frequencies
of occurrences in a set of hash table collisions, with average
run time independent of queries in the data store.
In this section, we present the high-level concept behind
Blacklight, starting from the invariant property of black-box
attacks that drives our design, followed by an overview of the
probabilistic fingerprinting system. Our design of Blacklight
focuses on image classification tasks. We leave extension to
domains such as speech recognition and NLP to future work.
4.1 Invariant Property of Black-box Attacks
We design Blacklight to exploit a fundamental invariant of
query-based black-box attacks – because a successful black-
box attack must satisfy the perturbation constraint defined by
Eq. (1), the attacker must submit some (at least two) image
queries separated by small differences in the input space.
Since this level of similarity rarely exists between benign
queries, it can be used to accurately detect the attack while
incurring minimal false positives.
More specifically, to craft adversarial examples under the
perturbation constraint, a black-box attacker iteratively per-
turbs a query image xi+1, based on query results from the
model on the previous images {x j} j≤i. The specifics of the
4
NES - 
Query Limit
Boundary
HSJA
X1 X2 X3 X10 X1000 Xn
... ... ...
X0
... ... ...
... ... ...
Figure 1: Examples of attack queries (x0,x1,x2, ..,xn), gen-
erated by 3 black-box attacks. Attacks produce a sequence
of input queries starting with the original source image x0
and culminating in xn, the final adversarial example. While
attacks vary in how they search for adversarial examples, sim-
ilar query images are common across all attack sequences.
iterative perturbations vary across algorithms: some start with
the original input and perturbs it towards a misclassified target
label [22,34], while others start from an image in the target la-
bel and work backwards towards the original input [3, 10, 22].
In each case, the attacker seeks to repeatedly refine the pertur-
bation between the original input and a potential adversarial
example until it invariably converges on an adversarial exam-
ple that is highly similar to the original input image in the
input space. Mathematically, there exist attack queries {xi}
that
min
0≤ j<i
||xi− x j||p ≤ µ, (2)
and µ is a small number. If µ is smaller than the difference
between most benign queries, we can accurately recognize
xi as an attack image by comparing it to the queries stored
in the defender database. As long as xi is highly similar to
any previous attack queries stored in the database, it will be
detected by Blacklight. Evading this type of detection is ex-
tremely difficult (if not infeasible) since it requires each attack
query xi to be sufficiently dissimilar from any previous attack
queries x j, 0 ≤ j < i. Clearly, this requirement contradicts
with the attack perturbation constraint defined by Eq. (1).
In Figure 1, we demonstrate the invariant property using
query images generated by launching 3 of the attacks summa-
rized in §2 on ImageNet (we omit NES Label-only and ECO
for brevity because they produce similar traces). We show
a sample of images in the sequence of attack queries from
the original x0 to the final adversarial example xn. Similarity
between images in a sequence are common, and average L2
distances between consecutive attack queries are a factor of
20-380x smaller than analogous distances between benign im-
ages (calculated by randomly choosing 2000 pairs of images
from ImageNet).
4.2 Efficient Detection of Perturbed Images
Leveraging this invariant property of black-box attacks, one
can now detect attack queries by searching for queries with
high similarity in a large stream of incoming queries. A naive
approach would store all queries and compare an incoming
query x to previous queries in the database and compute their
Lp distances. This, however, is infeasible in practice because a
model F can receive a large set of queries per day, e.g. millions
or tens of millions. Image-based query comparison requires
intractable costs both in storage (to store raw query images)
and in computational costs. For example, on the ImageNet
dataset (224x224 pixels), it takes 23 minutes to compare a
single query image and one million prior images, computed
via five threads on a 6-core Intel Xeon server.
Probabilistic Fingerprints. Blacklight overcomes this
challenge by applying a probabilistic algorithm that detects
highly similar images.
One alternative would be to compute a hash signature per
query image, using a distance-preserving hashing function,
e.g. a locality-sensitive hash or locality-preserving hashing al-
gorithm. However, locality-sensitive hashes lack the capacity
to capture small differences in large files, locality-preserving
hashes are easily reversed and manipulated to avoid detec-
tion by an adaptive adversary. Instead, what we want is a
hash function that is compact, and yet highly sensitive to very
small changes in the image. This dictates that we use a highly
lossy function. The probabilistic fingerprints achieve these
properties, and utilize secure one-way hashes that cannot be
easily reversed to avoid detection.
We take all continuous segments of some fixed length w
from the image, and apply a one-way hash to each segment
to produce a large set of hash values. From these, we choose
a small set (e.g. 50) of hash values, which together form the
image’s probabilistic fingerprint. Figure 2 illustrates an ex-
ample. For each incoming query x, Blacklight extracts its
probabilistic fingerprint and stores it in the database. Black-
light then runs an efficient hash match algorithm to detect
overlaps between x’s fingerprint and previously stored finger-
prints. Upon detecting sufficient overlap between x and an
existing fingerprint y, Blacklight flags x and y as a pair of
attack images. That is, using fingerprinting matching, Black-
light successfully identifies the two attack images “buried” in
many benign images.
This fingerprint scheme has the property that any two
highly similar query images will have near-perfect matches in
their fingerprints. In other words, small changes to an image
are highly unlikely to impact the image’s fingerprint. The
secure one-way hash and downsampling of the hash values
means that unless they can reverse the hashing algorithm, a
clever adversary cannot significantly alter the fingerprint of
an image without significantly altering the image itself.
In addition to dramatically reducing the storage overhead
of past queries, Blacklight’s probabilistic fingerprints also
significantly reduce the computation complexity of searching
for similar queries. The search for similar queries reduces
down to a hash collision counting problem, which takes near-
constant time for the common case (see §5).
Prior Work. Probabilistic fingerprints have been used for
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Figure 2: Blacklight computes for each raw image a small set of hash entries (a probabilistic fingerprint). Blacklight detects
attack images hidden inside a large stream of benign images by comparing and detecting highly similar fingerprints.
4 8 2 0 7 7 1 5 5
SHA(w1) = h1
4 8 2 0 7 7 1 5 5
SHA(w2) = h2
4 8 2 0 7 7 1 5 5
SHA(w3) = h3
Sliding Window
Figure 3: Computing content hashes w/ a sliding window.
similarity detection in the text domain, identifying source
code plagiarism [4, 16, 42, 45], network intrusions and mal-
ware [36, 41, 46] and even spam emails [30, 57]. It was also
used in sif, a similarity detector for file systems [33].
Our work extends probabilistic fingerprinting beyond the
text domain and uses it to identify similar image queries sub-
mitted to a model. The continuous nature of images makes the
similarity comparison difficult because a small value change
on an input will change its fingerprint. We address this prob-
lem next in §5 with pixel quantization.
5 Detailed Design of Blacklight
We begin this section by presenting details of the Blacklight
system and the details of the fingerprint generation process.
We then describe scalability optimizations to further reduce
computation and storage overheads, and enhancement to im-
prove robustness. Finally, we discuss our thoughts on different
approaches to mitigate attacks post-detection.
5.1 System Details
The goal of Blacklight is to protect a DNN model by com-
puting for each incoming query image a small (fixed) set of
hash entries, and then comparing this fingerprint to stored
fingerprints of prior queries to determine if the new query has
extremely high similarity to any prior query. Our hypothesis
is that most images produced during a black-box attack share
high content similarity, and this invariant property is the key
to Blacklight’s detection.
Blacklight achieves this goal in three steps.
Step 1: Pixel Quantization. Given an input query x, Black-
light first applies a quantization function to each pixel value
of x. This has two purposes. First, quantization converts the
continuous pixel value space into a finite set of discrete values,
which are then used to compute hash values. Second, quanti-
zation also helps to increase the similarity between (attack)
images, since some black-box attacks choose to modify every
pixel with extremely small values. Quantization effectively
nullifies the contribution of those minor modifications.
Step 2: Computing fingerprints. To produce the finger-
print on a (quantized) query image, Blacklight first “flattens”
the 2-D image into a linear pixel sequence by combining
rows of pixels together. The length of the vector is |x|, the
total number of pixel elements of the input x. Blacklight then
applies a sliding window of size w on this single vector, it-
eratively moving the sliding the window by p (referred to
as the sliding step). This produces N = (|x|−w+p)/p fixed
size vectors, each of length w. Any two subsequent vectors
overlap by w−p entries, and each pixel in x is included in
w/p consecutive vectors.
Next, Blacklight applies a secure one-way hash function
(e.g. SHA-3 combined with a random salt value chosen by the
defender) to each vector i (i ∈ [1,N]), producing a hash entry
hi based on vector i’s pixel values. This creates a full hash
set Hx = (h1,h2, ...,hN) for query x, which contains N hash
entries. For example, for CIFAR10 where |x|= 32×32×3=
3072, we have N = 3053 when w = 20, p = 1. An example
of this sliding window hashing scheme is shown in Figure 3.
Finally, instead of using Hx as x’s fingerprint, Blacklight
selects the top S hash values in Hx (sorted by numerical order)
as its probabilistic fingerprint (denoted as S(Hx)). Since the
output distribution of the one-way hash function should be
highly random, choosing the top S subset by numerical sort
serves as an efficient downsampling algorithm that is both
deterministic (i.e. the same image will always produce the
same set of S hash values), and unpredictable by an adversary
(predicting the top S hash values in numeric order requires
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Figure 4: We empirically show that our proposed probabilistic fingerprints are able to identify the invariant property in black-box
attack sequences. We plot the maximum fingerprint overlap between x and that of any prior query in the sequence. The fingerprint
overlap between two queries x and y is defined by |S(Hx)∩S(Hy)|. We plot this a sequence of 1000 randomly chosen benign
queries, and for the first 1000 attack queries generated by five representative black-box attacks.
accurately predicting all hash values for all pixel vectors in
an image).
We illustrate this property in Figure 4 by computing the
similarity across query fingerprints S(Hx). We consider a
sequence of 1000 random benign image queries, and attack
sequences generated by each of our 5 black-box attacks. For
each query x in each sequence, we compute the maximum
number of matching hash values between x’s fingerprint and
that of any prior query: |S(Hx)∩S(Hy)|. While each finger-
print only contains S= 50 hash entries, the disparity in results
between benign sequences and attack sequences is obvious.
Benign queries share minimal overlap with prior queries. In
sequences generated by the five attacks, there exist many at-
tack queries whose fingerprints are highly similar to at least
one of previous attack queries, allowing Blacklight to detect
the attack in its early stage.
Step 3: Comparing and matching fingerprints. Upon re-
ceiving a new query x, Blacklight will compute its fingerprint
S(Hx) and compare it with all the fingerprints stored in the
database. If any stored fingerprint shares more than T hash
entries with S(Hx), then x is flagged as an attack image. Here
the value of T can be configured to meet the desired false pos-
itive rate. Later in §6, we analytically show that by properly
configuring T and S, we can achieve accurate attack detection
at a low false positive rate.
Computing the maximum overlap between the fingerprint
of a query and m stored fingerprints is non-trivial. A simple al-
gorithm would incur computation cost of O(m). A slightly bet-
ter algorithm can store a query x’s fingerprint into a hashmap
using each of its hash entry as a key. The maximum overlap
with all m queries can be found by retrieving all queries as-
sociated with each key in x’s fingerprints, and counting the
max frequency of any query in that set. An efficient imple-
mentation can produce average runtime cost that is a constant
independent of m. We leave the design and analysis of an
efficient hashset matching algorithm to future work.
Scalability. In practice, the defender can periodically (e.g.
once per day) reset the fingerprints of prior queries to avoid
overflowing local storage (and also refresh the salt value for
the secure hash). An attacker can attempt to space its black-
box queries across different days to evade detection, we con-
sider this Pause and Resume attack in §8.1.
5.2 Attack Mitigation
The ultimate goal of a defense is to ensure no adversarial
examples reach the protected DNN model. Detecting the pres-
ence of a black-box attack is insufficient, since a persistent
attacker can simply switch accounts and/or IP addresses and
continue where the previous query left off. Here, we discuss
different options for mitigation after an attack is detected.
Ban accounts. A simple response to a detected attack query
is to ban the account where it came from. Though easy to
implement, this approach has two issues. First, this increases
the penalty for a false positive, which might negatively im-
pact wide deployment. Second, resource rich attackers can
continue the attack using Sybil accounts, which are difficult
to eradicate in practice.
Return misguided outputs. We also consider a more elab-
orate scheme where the defender intentionally misleads the
attacker by returning carefully biased query outputs, perhaps
towards secondary goals like identifying the attacker. This
approach faces additional challenges. First, crafting biased
responses requires significantly more computation and state-
keeping at the defender. Second, the defender must be careful
to avoid returning valid responses to actual attacks.
Reject all detected queries. We choose a simple mitigation
strategy: reject all detected attack queries. This mitigation is
effective in preventing attacks IFF the ratio of attack queries
detected is high. If most attack queries are rejected, the attack
sequence takes a very long time to converge and succeed. The
benefit of this approach is that it does not rely on detecting
or reducing Sybil accounts, and false positives have minimal
impact on benign users. We further evaluate the impact of
mitigation on persistent attackers in §7.
6 Formal Analysis of Blacklight
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We perform a formal analysis on whether Blacklight can dis-
tinguish between benign and attack queries. Our analysis
starts from a formal model on Blacklight’s probabilistic fin-
gerprinting process, using which we run a detailed analysis
on the probability of Blacklight flagging an image pair (x,y)
as attack queries. We use this to compute Blacklight’s false
positive rate and attack query detection rate, and examine
their dependency on T , the fingerprint matching threshold.
Definition 1. Hash Function is a function that, for a given
input x, produces N hash values, Hx = (h1,h2, ...,hN). Each
entry hi is a positive integer that is independent and identi-
cally distributed (I.I.D.) in the hash space [1,Ω], where Ω is a
very large positive integer,Ω>>N. Without loss of generality,
hi follows a uniform distribution within [1,Ω].
Definition 2. Given two queries x and y, we represent their
full hash set as Hx = Hsh ∪ Hˆx and Hy = Hsh ∪ Hˆy, where
Hsh =Hx∩Hy, Hˆx∩Hˆy = /0, |Hsh|=N−D, |Hˆx|= |Hˆy|=D.
For simplicity, we assume Hsh∩ Hˆx = /0, Hsh∩ Hˆy = /0.
The amount of hash difference D between x and y depends
on whether (x,y) is a pair of benign inputs or attack inputs:
D =
{
δbenign, (x,y) is a benign input pair
δattack, (x,y) is an attack input pair
where δattack is a small number determined by the attack per-
turbation budget. In general we have δbenign >> δattack.
Definition 3. Probabilistic Fingerprinting (PF) is a func-
tion performed on the full hash set that samples top S hash
entries out of Hx, i.e. S(Hx) = (h′1,h′2, ...,h′S)⊂Hx.
Blacklight operates on S(Hx) to detect attack queries rather
than the full hash set Hx. Blacklight marks (x,y) as attack
images if |S(Hx)∩S(Hy)|> T .
Theorem 1. Consider query pairs (x,y) whose full hash
sets Hx and Hx differ by D entries (i.e. |Hx \Hy| = D).
Let Q(D) , Pr (|S(Hx)∩S(Hy)|> T ) be the probability of
Blacklight flagging any such (x,y) as attack images. Then
Q(D) is bounded:
Q−(D)≤Q(D)≤Q+(D),
where Q+(D),
min(S,N−D)
∑
k=T+1
(N−D
k
) · ( DS−k)(N
S
) ,
Q−(D),= ∑
min(S,N−D)
k=T+1 Ak
∑min(S,N−D)i=0 Ai
.
and Ai is defined in the appendix.
Proof. We prove the upper bound by considering a differ-
ent PF function S(.) that selects S hash entries to maximize
|S(Hx)∩ S(Hy)|. Similarly, we derive the lower bound by
configuring a new PF to minimize |S(Hx)∩S(Hy)| by inde-
pendently selecting S entries from Hx and Hy. The detailed
proof is listed in the appendix.
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Figure 5: Comparing the theoretical upper bound Q+(D) and
the actual Q(D) derived from empirical experiments. The
two metrics align with each other and both decay fast with D.
The choice of T has a visible impact on both. Here S = 50,
N = 3053 (CIFAR10), 0≤ D≤ N.
Figure 5 plots the numerical value of Q+(D) vs. D, for
N = 3053 (based on input size of CIFAR10, w = 20, p = 1),
S = 50 and T = 25 or 40. We see that Q+(D) decays very
fast with D. We also empirically compute the actual Q(D)
vs. D curve by running Blacklight on both benign and attack
queries generated using CIFAR10, under the same w, p, S and
T . They are plotted as dashed lines in the same Figure. We
see that our theoretical upper bound Q+(D) is a tight bound
on Q(D). More importantly, both Q+(D) and Q(D) decay
very fast with D. The same applies to Q−(D).
Using Theorem 1, we compute the false positive rate of
Blacklight as the probability that two benign inputs are de-
tected as attack inputs: PFP =Q(δbenign), and the attack query
detection rate as Pdetect =Q(δattack). Since Q(D) decays fast
with D, Blacklight should achieve PFP→ 0 and Pdetect → 1
as long as δbenign >> δattack.
Choosing T . Given N and S, varying T will have a visible
impact on Q(D) – decreasing T could increase attack query
detection rate at the cost of a higher false positive rate. One
can examine the model’s training data to compute δbenign and
use it to configure T to meet a desired false positive rate.
7 Experimental Evaluation of Blacklight
Using four different image classification tasks (and datasets),
we now empirically evaluate Blacklight against five represen-
tative black-box attacks (as discussed in §2.3). Our experi-
ments focus on understanding 1) the effectiveness of Black-
light in both attack detection and mitigation; 2) the improve-
ment over existing defenses; and 3) Blacklight’s storage and
computation overhead.
7.1 Experimental Setup
We apply Blacklight to defend against five representative
black-box attacks (§2.3), using four different image classifi-
cation tasks. These experiments involve DNN models F with
a wide range of input size/content and model architectures,
allowing us to study Blacklight performance under a diverse
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Task Dataset # Classes
Training
data size
Test data
size Input size Model architecture Model accuracy
Digit Recognition (MNIST) MNIST 10 60,000 10,000 (28, 28, 1) 6 Conv + 3 Dense 99.36%
Traffic Sign Recognition (GTSRB) GTSRB 43 39,209 12,630 (48, 48, 3) 6 Conv + 3 Dense 97.59%
Object Recognition - Small (CIFAR10) CIFAR-10 10 50,000 10,000 (32, 32, 3) ResNet20 91.48%
Object Recognition - Large (ImageNet) ImageNet 1000 1,281,167 50,000 (224, 224, 3) ResNet152 73.05%
Table 2: Overview of classification tasks with their associated datasets and models.
set of conditions.
Image Classification Tasks. We consider four representa-
tive classification tasks, including MNIST [27], GTSRB [48],
CIFAR10 [24], and ImageNet [43]. We summarize key prop-
erties of each task and associated models in Table 2. The
detailed information on model architectures and training con-
figurations are in Table 13 in Appendix.
Attack Configurations. We implement and run the five
black-box attacks against each of the above four classifica-
tion models. For MNIST, GTSRB and CIFAR10, we randomly
select 100 images from its test dataset and use each as the
source image of the attack (i.e. x0). For ImageNet, we use 50
source images (due to its higher computation cost).
When configuring each attack, we follow its original pa-
per and use the same L distance metric (L2 or L∞) stated by
the paper. We normalize the input value range to [0,1], and
normalize L2 by the size of the input. We set the perturbation
budget to 0.05 for all attacks and tasks. The only exceptions
are L∞ attacks against MNIST – we find that a perturbation
budget of 0.1 is necessary for these attacks to succeed. The
detailed attack parameters are listed in Table 3. Finally, we
run each attack until it terminates (i.e. successfully generat-
ing an adversarial example) or until it reaches 100K queries,
whichever occurs first.
Blacklight Configuration. Table 4 lists Blacklight’s de-
fault configuration of key parameters, including sliding win-
dow size w, sliding step p, quantization step q, number of hash
entries per fingerprint (S), and fingerprint matching threshold
(T ). To show the generality of Blacklight, we set the param-
eters to be the same default values for all four tasks, rather
than “optimizing” them for each task. The only exception is
the sliding window size w – our default value is 20, but we
increase it to 50 for MNIST (due to its large black background)
and ImageNet (due to its large image size).
Evaluation Metrics. We use the following performance
metrics to capture the effectiveness and cost of Blacklight.
• False positive rate.
• Attack detection rate: % of black-box attacks detected
before the attack completes.
• Detection coverage: % of queries in an attack’s query
sequence) identified as an attack query.
• Average # of queries to detect: Average number of attack
queries received before Blacklight detects the attack.
Attack Type
Attack
detect %
Detection
coverage
Queries
to detect
Attack
success
Median
queries
M
N
IS
T
NES - QL 100% 99.4% 2 0% DNF
NES - LO 100% 98.9% 2 0% DNF
Boundary 100% 61.6% 19 0% DNF
ECO 100% 99.9% 2 0% DNF
HSJA 100% 98.3% 6 0% 7948
G
TS
R
B
NES - QL 100% 98.7% 2 0% 24829
NES - LO 100% 98.0% 3 0% DNF
Boundary 100% 64.0% 22 0% DNF
ECO 100% 100.0% 2 0% 2994
HSJA 100% 98.3% 6 0% 3968
C
IF
A
R
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NES - QL 100% 98.4% 2 0% 1961
NES - LO 100% 98.4% 2 0% 6447
Boundary 100% 68.8% 28 0% 2076
ECO 100% 99.6% 2 0% 760
HSJA 100% 96.4% 6 0% 957
Im
ag
eN
et
NES - QL 100% 97.6% 3 0% 10213
NES - LO 100% 95.2% 6 0% DNF
Boundary 100% 94.9% 48 0% 69509
ECO 100% 99.9% 2 0% 3066
HSJA 100% 98.3% 7 0% 12625
Table 5: Detection and mitigation results on all attacks and model
combinations. Attack success represents success rate of attacks with
Blacklight mitigation, and Median queries represents the median
# of queries required to complete a specific attack. DNF denotes
attacks where a median value was unavailable, because less than
50% of attacks finished in less than 100K queries.
• Attack success rate with mitigation: Success rate of a
persistent attacker when Blacklight rejects all detected at-
tack queries.
• Detection overhead: Run-time latency and storage costs.
Setting Matching Threshold T . Fingerprint matching
threshold T is the key parameter that controls the tradeoff
between detection rate and false positives. In practice, proba-
bilistic fingerprints should perform well for a range of mod-
erate values of T , e.g. threshold set to half of all hashes in
the fingerprint (T ∼ 0.5×S). Figure 6 shows the false posi-
tive rates (across the entire test data) for different values of
threshold T . We set T to a default value of 25 (0.5×S), which
achieves low false positives (<0.1%) and high detection for
nearly all of our attacks.
7.2 Attack Detection and Mitigation
We evaluate Blacklight’s detection rate by implementing and
performing each of the five black-box attacks against each
classification model. For each attack and task combination,
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Attack
Type
Distance
Metric
Perturbation
Budget
NES - QL L∞
0.05
(0.1 for MNIST)
NES - LO L∞
0.05
(0.1 for MNIST)
Boundary L2 0.05
ECO L∞
0.05
(0.1 for MNIST)
HSJA L2 0.05
Table 3: Black-box attack con-
figurations.
Task MNIST GTSRB CIFAR10 ImageNet
Quantization
step (q) 50 50 50 50
Sliding window
size (w) 50 20 20 50
Sliding step (p) 1 1 1 1
# of hashes per
fingerprint (S) 50 50 50 50
Matching
threshold (T ) 25 25 25 25
Table 4: Default configuration of Blacklight.
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Figure 6: False positive rate for Blacklight’s at-
tack detection under different choices of matching
threshold T when S = 50.
we run 100 iterations of each attack (50 for ImageNet). Each
attack iteration selects a random image from the test dataset as
source image of the attack x0, and a random incorrect label as
the misclassification target label. Three attacks (NES - Label
Only, Boundary and HSJA) require an image from the target
label to perform the attack, and we select a random image
belonging to the target label for that purpose.
The results for all attacks are listed in Table 5. First, we
note that the attacks varied significantly on speed of conver-
gence (# of queries before it produced an adversarial example
xn). Many attacks failed to converge even after generating
100,000 queries. We performed additional tests, and for some
attack types (particularly NES-Label Only and attacks on
MNIST), increasing the query limit beyond 100K produced
diminishing returns on attacks completed. In other words,
the large majority of attacks that did not complete in 100K
queries, still did not complete given 200K or 300K queries.
To characterize the length of these attacks (many of which
are unbounded), we show the median in numbers of queries
to completion in the last column of Table 5 (Median Queries).
We see that for most attacks, the median attack took between
several hundred to tens of thousands of queries to complete.
We summarize key results from Blacklight’s detection.
First, Blacklight detects all attacks on all models in progress
(Attack detection rate is 100% for all tests). Second, detection
coverage is extremely high: Blacklight detects more than 96%
of all attack queries, except on the Boundary attack, whose
algorithm converges to the adversarial example very slowly4.
Third, Blacklight detect a new attack very quickly, often after
a handful of (2–6) queries (again, more queries required for
Boundary because it converges slower). In all cases, Black-
light detects an attack in less than 1% of the queries it takes
for the median attack to complete.
When Blacklight rejects queries that it identifies as attack
queries, 0% of persistent attackers manage to complete their
attack within 100K attack queries. Blacklight’s mitigation is
highly effective because it is able to detect a large majority of
attack queries. By rejecting these queries, Blacklight prevents
the attacker from making forward progress in probing model
4We note that Boundary and NES-LO take the longest time to converge.
Less than 50% of NES-LO complete in 100K queries for MNIST, GTSRB
and ImageNet.
Attack
Detection
coverage
Avg queries
to detect
Attack success
w/ mitigation
NES - QL 1.8% / 98.4% 52 / 2 97% / 0%
NES - LO 1.3% / 98.4% 52 / 2 85% / 0%
Boundary 1.0% / 68.8% 54 / 28 82% / 0%
ECO 1.8% / 99.6% 53 / 2 78% / 0%
HSJA 1.7% / 96.4% 52 / 6 100% / 0%
Table 6: Performance comparison between Stateful Detection and
Blacklight on CIFAR10, in terms of attack detection and mitigation.
The result is presented as “Stateful Detection / Blacklight” where
the result of Blacklight is bold.
classification boundaries. As such, a high detection coverage
is critical to defend against black-box attacks.
Key Takeaways. In summary, Blacklight detects all attacks
on all models, detects the overwhelming majority of indi-
vidual queries in the attack sequence, and detects the attack
quickly (usually in less than 10 queries, with the exception
of the slow converging Boundary attack). When Blacklight
mitigation is active (it rejects queries identified as attacks),
no attacks across our attack types and models are able to
complete an attack in 100K queries.
7.3 Comparison with Prior Work
The only existing defense we know from literature is the
Stateful Detection (SD) method from a 2019 arxiv report [13].
We compare Blacklight side-by-side against SD, using pa-
rameters specified in [13]. We can only provide experimental
results on CIFAR10, because the authors of SD only shared
their proposed similarity encoder for CIFAR10.
Table 6 compares the attack detection and mitigation perfor-
mance between SD and Blacklight (results in bold). While
both methods can detect the presence of the black-box at-
tack (before it succeeds), Blacklight outperforms SD signifi-
cantly in detection coverage. While SD can only detect a very
small portion of the attack queries (less than 2%), Blacklight
achieves 68+% coverage for Boundary and 96+% coverage
for all other attacks (NES-QL, NES-LO, ECO, HSJA). As
such, Blacklight can completely disable the attack by reject-
ing attack queries, reducing success rate of all instances of
each attack type to 0% (after 100K queries). On the other
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hand, since SD only detects (and responds to) a small percent-
age (< 2%) of attack queries, it has limited ability to slow
down persistent attackers. Success rates of persistent attackers
against SD range from 78% (ECO) to 100% (HSJA).
We believe SD’s low detection coverage is a consequence
of the high computation complexity of its similarity detection
algorithm. To scale to a large number of queries, SD resets its
detector upon detecting an attack query. It assumes that ban-
ning the user account used to submit the attack query stops the
attack. In practice, this assumption often fails because attack-
ers can easily coordinate a single attack sequence across mul-
tiple accounts. In contrast, Blacklight’s more lightweight sim-
ilarity computation allows it to compare each query against
100,000 prior fingerprints in a few milliseconds (Figure 7).
We give more detailed performance analysis of Blacklight
and SD in the next section.
7.4 Performance Overhead
Next, we take a closer look at runtime latency of Blacklight
and SD, using measurements on an Intel i7 desktop server
with 64 GB memory. Computing hash signatures is a fixed
cost per image (and incurs negligible latency on today’s hard-
ware), so the bulk of per-query costs come from searching for
matching fingerprints in a large database of fingerprints of
prior queries.
We measure Blacklight fingerprint matching latency for
small (32×32,CIFAR10) and larger (224×224, ImageNet)
images, using default configurations from Table 4. For dif-
ferent configurations, Figure 7 plots Blacklight’s latency to
search for fingerprint matches (per incoming query) as a func-
tion of the number of queries stored in the database (n). The
curves are flat over n, suggesting that in the common case,
Blacklight’s matching cost is near-constant and independent
of n. In contrast, we also plot SD’s per-query match latency
(only available for CIFAR) for different database sizes (no
resets). It scales linearly with database size, and quickly sur-
passes Blacklight per-query latency for all but the smallest
databases. Note that we can dramatically reduce per-query
match time for Blacklight by increasing the sliding step p
from 1 up to w/2. For larger images, this helps us avoid
growth of total hashes per query, and has minimal impact on
detection performance. We omit additional detailed perfor-
mance tuning results due to space constraints.
Finally, hash-based fingerprints are extremely small in
terms of storage costs. Across all parameters in our exper-
iments, a fingerprint is at most 32 · S bytes (160B for our
default configuration). Thus fingerprints for 1 million queries
would only require 2GB of storage, a “negligible” value for
modern servers.
8 Robustness Against Adaptive Attacks
Any meaningful defense must be robust against countermea-
sures from adaptive attackers with knowledge of the defense.
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Figure 7: Blacklight’s runtime latency for CIFAR10 and ImageNet
as a function of the number of queries in the database. Note the log
Y axis. Blacklight’s hashtable based matching algorithm produces
latency that is independent of size of database for the common case.
In contrast, SD’s algorithm is significantly slower and scales linearly
with # of entries in the database. This forces SD to frequently reset
their database, resulting in low detection coverage.
In this section, we consider two types of adaptive adversaries:
skilled adversaries who know the target model is protected by
Blacklight without specific knowledge of the detailed param-
eters, and oracle adversaries, who know everything about the
Blacklight defense, including hashing window size, quantiza-
tion values, etc. The only thing they do not have are the salt
values added to the hash algorithms, since those are randomly
generated every time the database resets.
We explore potential countermeasures in two broad cate-
gories. First, we consider attackers who try to evade Black-
light detection by modifying the attack. Second, we study
Blacklight’s robustness against ideal attacks that go beyond
the constraints for today’s attacks.
8.1 Evading Blacklight Detection
Blackbox attacks use iterative queries to estimate the loss
surface around a source image. One possibility for evasion is
to apply controlled noise to attack queries, in a way that does
not disrupt classification, but may be significant enough to
create significant differences in query fingerprints, and force
Blacklight to overlook the similarity to prior queries. We
propose 4 different adaptive attack strategies and evaluate the
attack success rate and our attack detection rate over them.
Perturbing Queries with Image Transformations (Skilled
Adversary). To magnify differences between attack
queries, we can add additional perturbations to new queries.
Here we explore 2 types of image transformation methods:
adding noise and applying image augmentation. We first add
different magnitudes of Gaussian noise to each attack query.
Second, we apply different image augmentation like shift,
rotation, zoom and blending to each attack query.
Table 7 shows that attack success rate and detection rate for
all the transformations of different attacks on CIFAR10. Note
that for each image transformation, we are showing detection
rate on successful attacks. Blacklight’s detection of failed
attacks drops slowly as noise levels increase. Since failed
11
Attack Type
Transformation Type Gaussian Noise with Different Standard Deviation Image Augmentation
0.0001 0.0005 0.001 0.005 0.01 0.05 Shift Rotation Zoom Combined
NES -
Query Limit
Attack Success Rate 85% 80% 60% 15% 0% 0% 100% 75% 80% 60%
Detection of Successful Attacks 100% 100% 100% 100% N/A N/A 100% 100% 100% 100%
NES -
Label Only
Attack Success Rate 25% 20% 15% 15% 0% 0% 100% 45% 70% 20%
Detection of Successful Attacks 100% 100% 100% 100% N/A N/A 100% 100% 100% 100%
Boundary Attack Success Rate 90% 90% 90% 85% 45% 0% 90% 90% 90% 90%Detection of Successful Attacks 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% N/A 100% 100% 100% 100%
ECO Attack Success Rate 85% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%Detection of Successful Attacks 100% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
HSJA Attack Success Rate 95% 20% 10% 5% 5% 0% 0% 5% 10% 15%Detection of Successful Attacks 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% N/A N/A 100% 100% 100%
Table 7: Attack success rate and Blacklight detection of successful attacks as attackers add different image transformations.
attacks are not of interest, we omit them for brevity.
For each setting, we run 20 attack traces. For Gaussian
noise, we add different standard deviations of the Gaussian
noise to each image query from 0.0001 to 0.05 (all inputs are
normalized to [0,1]). Sufficient noise can disrupt the image
fingerprint and evade detection. However, higher levels of
noise make attacks harder to converge. Table 7 shows that
as noise levels increase, attack success rates drop quickly.
But at all noise levels, Blacklight is able to detect all of the
successful attacks. Thus Gaussian noise has no discernable
impact on Blacklight’s attack detection.
For image augmentation, we test 4 different cases where
the attacker shifts each query by at most 10%, rotates each
query by at most 10◦, zoom each query by at most 10% and
where the attacker combines these three techniques together.
Table 7 shows that while different attacks react differently to
image augmentation techniques (some still produce success-
ful attacks while others fail completely), Blacklight is able
to detect all successful attack traces under different type of
augmentations.
Increasing Learning Rates (Skilled Adversary). Other
than adding external transformations to queries, the attacker
can also try to evade detection by tweaking their learning
rate parameter to increase the difference between each attack
queries. Learning rate controls the difference between two
adjacent queries when estimating the gradients. This does not
apply to gradient estimation free attacks (Boundary and ECO
attacks). We only explore different learning rate for NES-QL,
NES-LO and HSJA attacks. For two variants of NES, we
gradually increase learning rate more than 1000 fold. While
the attack success rate drops to 0%, detection success rate
remains 100%. For HSJA, we gradually grow learning rate
up to a factor of 106-fold, until changes in learning rate no
longer impacts gradient estimation results. We observe that
the attack success rate steadily drops (eventually to 15%), but
detection rate maintains 100% throughout.
Pause and Resume Attack (Oracle Adversary). An at-
tacker with full knowledge of a Blacklight system can exploit
the fact that Blacklight periodically resets its database. An
attacker can avoid detection by pausing their attack every time
Attack Type Average Reset Cycles Needed Average Total Queries
NES-QL 11471 12695
NES-LO 65837 67099
Boundary 2285 6160
ECO 5132 5133
HSJA 1092 1125
Table 8: Average reset cycles needed for a successful Pause
and Resume attack on CIFAR10. The fastest attack (HSJA)
can succeed in roughly 3 years.
it receives a rejection response, and resuming the attack the
next time Blacklight resets its database. We run experiments
through all 5 black-box attacks using this strategy against
a CIFAR10 model and Blacklight. We run 100 instances of
each attack, and show average total queries needed for each
attack to succeed, and the average number of reset cycles that
requires in Table 8. If we reset Blacklight every 24 hours, the
fastest successful attacker would complete an attack (using
HSJA) in 1092 days or roughly 3 years. While this strategy
does allow for a successful attack, the time cost to perform
this attack is well beyond all but the most patient of attackers.
Guided Image Transformation (Oracle Attacker).
Given perfect knowledge of Blacklight’s configuration values,
an oracle attacker can compute precisely which pixels to
modify so as to alter the maximum number of pixel vectors
(and therefore maximum number of potential fingerprint
hash values). A single post-quantization pixel change affects
w/p−1 hash values. The perturbation must be large enough
to survive quantization, and each query’s must choose its
pixel perturbation to produce distinct hashes from that of all
prior perturbations. We implement an oracle transformation
algorithm that for each new query in the attack sequence,
computes a minimum pixel perturbation that guarantees
there are at most K hashes overlapping with prior query
perturbations.
We apply two versions of this query perturbation scheme,
where K = 0 (all unique hashes) and K = T (expected to be
barely detectable under threshold T ). Applying this to the two
fastest converging attacks (HSJA and ECO), we find that the
cumulative perturbations exceed the perturbation budget on
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Attack
Type
Default T = 25 (FPR = 0.0%) T = 15 (FPR = 0.74%)
0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
NES - QL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
NES - LO 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Boundary 100% 100% 75% 40% 100% 100% 100% 95%
ECO 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
HSJA 100% 100% 55% 40% 100% 100% 70% 40%
Table 9: Blacklight detection rate for attacks using larger pertur-
bation budgets for CIFAR10. Lowering T dramatically improves
detection even when allowing very large perturbations, with a small
increase in false positives (0.74%).
CIFAR10 after 23 queries (K = 0) and 533 queries (K = T ).
The takeaway is that while this attack provides successful
evasion, the noise required quickly exceeds the entire attack
perturbation budget, making it impractical.
8.2 Robustness against ideal attacks
Novel black-box attacks are being proposed at a rapid rate.
Many of them break current assumptions on what black-box
attacks can and cannot do. For example, future attacks may
allow larger perturbation budgets, or find novel methods to dra-
matically reduce the number of queries necessary to converge
to an adversarial example. In this section, we hypothesize
about potential future black-box attacks that break current
constraints, and evaluate Blacklight against some ideal black-
box attacks.
Increasing Attack Perturbation Budget. Till now, our
evaluation assumes attackers’ perturbation budgets are lim-
ited to commonly accepted values: Lin f /L2 = 0.05. We hy-
pothesize that future attacks might be able to tolerate a higher
perturbation budget in specific attack domains or settings.
Thus, we evaluate Blacklight’s detection performance against
attacks on CIFAR10 with perturbation budget.
For all attacks, we incrementally increase the perturbation
from 0.05 all the way up to 0.2, and show Blacklight detec-
tion rate for each perturbation level (running 20 attack traces
for each data point). We show that detection rates for NES
variants and ECO continue steady at 100%, but Boundary and
its related variant HSJA begin to evade detection at 0.15 and
higher. To adapt, we try tuning fingerprint matching threshold
T . We show in Table 9 that just by lowering T from 25 to
15, we can dramatically increase detection rates, restoring
perfect detection to most attacks (except HSJA at 0.15 and
0.2 perturbation and Boundary at 0.2). This drop in T only
increases false positive rates by 0.74%.
Near-Optimal Black-Box Attacks. Researchers are con-
tinually optimizing black-box attacks in terms of query effi-
ciency. We consider it critical for Blacklight to resist more
efficient attacks that are inevitable in the near future. Here we
simulate Blacklight’s expected detection performance against
two types of “near-optimal” black-box attacks. First, we con-
sider extremely “query-efficient” black-box attacks that re-
quire several order of magnitude fewer attack queries than
Attack Type
N
500 100 50 10
NES - Query Limit 100% 100% 100% 95%
NES - Label Only 100% 100% 100% 31%
Boundary 100% 90% 89% 48%
ECO 100% 100% 100% 100%
HSJA 100% 100% 100% 91%
CW Average N = 6.33, Detection rate = 100%
PGD Average N = 3.13, Detection rate = 81%
Table 10: Blacklight’s performance against near-optimal “query-
efficient” and “perfect-gradient” black-box attacks.
current attacks. Second, we consider “perfect-gradient” black-
box attacks who are able to estimate gradients as accurately
as a white-box attack, and use white-box algorithms to guide
their computation of adversarial examples.
To simulate Blacklight’s performance against a near-
optimal query-efficient black-box attack, we evenly downsam-
ple attack query traces from our current 5 black-box attacks to
generate attack traces that are a tiny fraction of current traces.
We then test Blacklight’s detection performance on these
subsampled attack traces. We show our results in Table 10.
Even when our attacks are able to complete in 500, 100, or 50
queries, Blacklight can still detect them near perfectly (100%
detection for 4 attacks and 89% for Boundary attack). Even
when these attacks complete within 10 queries, Blacklight is
still highly successful at detecting NES-QL, ECO and HSJA.
Finally, we imagine a perfect-gradient black-box algorithm
that is somehow able to perfectly predict gradient functions
from the results of its attack queries. Such an attack would
converge on an adversarial example as quickly as a white-box
algorithm that has full access to the full model. Each itera-
tion of the gradient calculation for an analogous white-box
attack would translate to a single query by the black-box at-
tacker. The perfect gradient black-box attack applies attack
algorithms such as CW [9] and PGD [32] to generate attack
sequences against our CIFAR10 model. On average, CW and
PGD converge after only 6.3 and 3.1 queries. Against simu-
lated black-box attacks using these attack queries, Blacklight
detects 100% of attacks driven by CW, and 81% of PGD-
driven attacks.
9 Conclusion
In this work, we present Blacklight, one of the first proposals
to defend DNN models against query-based black-box attacks.
It leverages the fundamental invariant of query-based black-
box attacks: attackers must iteratively query the target model
with a large number of similar images. Blacklight uses proba-
bilistic fingerprints to scalably identify highly-similar image
queries. Blacklight achieves near-perfect detection against
a suite of state-of-the-art black-box attacks, with negligible
false positives, and is robust to a range of adaptive and ideal-
ized countermeasures.
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A Detailed Proof for Theorem 1
We prove the upper and lower bounds separately below.
Proof of Upper Bound. Clearly S(Hx) = S(Hsh∪Hˆx) will
contain entries from Hsh and Hˆx. The same applies to S(Hy).
Since Hˆx ∩ Hˆy = /0, the overlapping entries of S(Hx) and
S(Hy) will only come from Hsh. That is,
(S(Hx)∩S(Hy))⊂Hsh, (3)
(S(Hx)\S(Hy))⊂ Hˆx (4)
(S(Hy)\S(Hx))⊂ Hˆy (5)
To calculate the upper bound on Pr(|S(Hx)∩S(Hy)|> T ),
we consider the “optimal scenario” using a custom-designed5
probabilistic fingerprinting process. When picking entries
from Hx and Hy, the chosen entries in Hsh are always the same
for x and y. This is to maximize the similarity between S(Hx)
and S(Hy), which will be higher than that offered by selecting
top S entries. Thus we compute Q+(D) as the probability of
more than T entries in S(Hx) (and S(Hy)) come from Hsh
and the rest come from Hˆx (Hˆy). Since each hash entry’s
value is IID, and |Hsh|= N−D, |Hˆx|= D, we calculate the
probability following the hypergeometric distribution and
arrive at Q+(D).
Proof of Lower Bound. Following the above discussion,
we derive the lower bound on Q(D) by considering a “worst”
case scenario: the probabilistic fingerprinting process picks S
entries out of Hx and Hy fully independently, thus minimizing
the similarity between S(Hx) and S(Hy).
With this in mind, we compute a lower bound Q−(D) as
the probability when the above fingerprinting process, when
independently selecting entries from Hx and Hy, chooses more
than T overlapping entries from Hsh (again assuming hash
entries are IID, thus each entry has the same probability of
getting chosen):
Q−(D) =
∑min(S,N−D)k=T+1 Ak
∑min(S,N−D)i=0 Ai
(6)
where Ai =
( D
S−i
)(N−D
i
)(( D
S−i
)
+2∑min(S,N−D)t=i+1
(N−D−i
t−i
)( D
S−i
))
.
Here Ai computes the the number of cases where the two
fingerprinting instances (one on Hx and one on Hy) choose i
overlapping entries from Hsh.
B Hybrid Defense against the Substitute
Model Attack
Blacklight is designed to detect query based black-box attacks.
It cannot defend against attacks transferred from a substitute
5 One possible design is picking hash entries by their indices. If the
fingerprinting process chooses the same set of hash indices for x and y, the
chosen entries in Hsh will be the same for x and y.
model. As we discussed in §2, substitute model attacks can
be effectively stalled by an existing defense called ensemble
adversarial training (EAT) [49]. EAT adversarially trains an
ensemble of models with different architectures [32], which
are shown to be robust against the substitute model attack.
Hence, to defend against all types of black-box attacks, the
defender can combine Blacklight with EAT to build a hybrid
defense system.
We build and evaluate a hybrid Blacklight and EAT defense
on the cifar task. Specifically, we build an ensemble model
with three different architectures (6-layer CNN, 8-layer CNN,
ResNet-20) and adversarially train the network using PGD
attacks as suggested by [32]. We use the same Blacklight
configuration as before.
We perform both substitute model based attacks and query
based black-box attacks against the above ensemble model
defended by Blacklight. For the substitute model attack we
run the state-of-art attack proposed by Papernot et al [38], and
for the query-based attacks we run the same five black-box
attacks. The result shows that the hybrid defense works well
and the two defenses do not interfere with each other. The sub-
stitute model attack achieves 0% success (thanks to EAT), and
Blacklight achieves the same accurate attack query detection
as reported before. Thus, we conclude that Blacklight, when
combined with EAT, can defend against today’s black-box
attacks.
C Experiment Configuration
Model Architecture. We now present the architecture of
DNN models used in our work.
• MNIST (Table 11) is a convolutional neural network
(CNN) consisting of two pairs of convolutional layers con-
nected by max pooling layers, followed by two fully con-
nected layers.
• GTSRB (Table 12) is a CNN consisting of three pairs of
convolutional layers connected by max pooling layers, fol-
lowed by two fully connected layers.
• CIFAR10 is a ResNet-20 [20] that includes 20 sequential
convolutional layers, followed by pooling, dropout, and
fully connected layers.
• ImageNet is the ResNet-152 [19] model trained on the
ImageNet dataset [43]. It has 152 residual blocks with over
60 millions parameters.
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Layer Index Layer Name Layer Type # of Channels Filter Size Activation Connected to
1 conv_1 Conv 32 3× 3 ReLU
2 conv_2 Conv 32 3× 3 ReLU conv_1
2 pool_1 MaxPool 32 2× 2 - conv_2
3 conv_3 Conv 64 3× 3 ReLU pool_1
4 conv_4 Conv 64 3× 3 ReLU conv_3
4 pool_2 MaxPool 64 2× 2 - conv_4
5 conv_5 Conv 128 3× 3 ReLU pool_2
6 conv_6 Conv 128 3× 3 ReLU conv_5
6 pool_3 MaxPool 128 2× 2 - conv_6
7 fc_1 FC 512 - ReLU pool_3
8 fc_2 FC 512 - ReLU fc_1
8 fc_3 FC 10 - Softmax fc_2
Table 11: Model Architecture for MNIST.
Layer Index Layer Name Layer Type # of Channels Filter Size Activation Connected to
1 conv_1 Conv 32 3× 3 ReLU
2 conv_2 Conv 32 3× 3 ReLU conv_1
2 pool_1 MaxPool 32 2× 2 - conv_2
3 conv_3 Conv 64 3× 3 ReLU pool_1
4 conv_4 Conv 64 3× 3 ReLU conv_3
4 pool_2 MaxPool 64 2× 2 - conv_4
5 conv_5 Conv 128 3× 3 ReLU pool_2
6 conv_6 Conv 128 3× 3 ReLU conv_5
6 pool_3 MaxPool 128 2× 2 - conv_6
7 fc_1 FC 512 - ReLU pool_3
8 fc_2 FC 512 - ReLU fc_1
8 fc_3 FC 43 - Softmax fc_2
Table 12: Model Architecture for GTSRB.
Table 13: Detailed information on datasets and defense configurations for each model dataset.
Model Training Configuration
MNIST epochs=50, batch=128, optimizer=Adam, lr=0.001
GTSRB epochs=50, batch=128, optimizer=Adam, lr=0.001
CIFAR10 epochs=200, batch=32, optimizer=Adam, lr=0.001 (the learning rate is scheduled to be reduced after 80, 120, 160, 180 epochs)
ImageNet Model trained and shared by He et al. [19]
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